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SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE:
THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER IN
ENGLAND AND WALES, 2000–2017
KEIR IRWIN-ROGERS & JULIAN V. ROBERTS*
I
INTRODUCTION
Suspended sentences of various forms have been an element of western
sentencing for decades,1 and almost all common law jurisdictions operate some
form of suspended sanction. Yet of all the alternatives to institutional
imprisonment, suspended sentences have proved the most problematic. This
was noted fifty years ago by Leslie Sebba, who identified this sanction as the
“one form of sentence whose very existence in the penal system is controversial:
the suspension of execution of sentence and in particular, the suspension of
sentences of imprisonment.”2
The essence of the suspended sentence is that “it threatens future
punishment for past misconduct.”3 Although closer to institutional confinement
than a community order and therefore more severe, in many regimes, a
suspended sentence is significantly less onerous than a term of immediate
imprisonment.4 Suspended sentences are also sometimes described as a means
for the person being sentenced to avoid any punishment, so long as they desist
from further offending during the period in which the sentence is suspended. A
number of jurisdictions have responded to this criticism by requiring suspended
sentence orders to carry mandatory and optional requirements. While this type
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1. For discussion of representative jurisdictions, see, for example, Peter Tak, Sentencing and
Punishment in the Netherlands, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 188
(Michael Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001); Thomas Weigend, Sentencing and Punishment in
Germany, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 188 (Michael Tonry & Richard
Frase eds., 2001); Josep Cid, Suspended Sentences in Spain: Decarceration and Recidivism, 52
PROBATION J. 169 (2015).
2. Leslie Sebba, Penal Reform and Court Practice: The Case of the Suspended Sentence, in 21
STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 133 (Israel Drapkin ed., 1969).
3. THOMAS O’MALLEY, SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 642 (3d ed. 2016).
4. See KAREN GELB, THE PERFECT STORM? THE IMPACTS OF ABOLISHING SUSPENDED
SENTENCES IN VICTORIA (2013).
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of reform may move the suspended sentence away from its original purpose,5 it
can also help to promote judicial and community confidence in the sanction.
Suspended sentence regimes around the world vary greatly, but they can
broadly be divided into two categories based on the requirements attached to
the orders. Some versions require people merely to refrain from further
offending and therefore have the same effect on all those sentenced to the same
length of order. Others allow courts to impose a range of requirements tailored
to the specific risks and needs of the individual. The current English suspended
sentence order falls into the second category.
The suspended sentence order (SSO) has been available to courts in
England and Wales since 1967.6 Between 1991 and 2005, courts could impose an
SSO only in exceptional circumstances; thus the sanction accounted for only a
small number of cases. Since then, as a result of several reforms, the volume of
suspended sentences has risen dramatically, from under 3000 in 2004 to over
40,000 in 2007.7 This is the most dramatic shift in English sentencing practice in
many decades and is at odds with the experience in some other jurisdictions
included in this article. The conditional sentence of imprisonment has been
greatly restricted in Canada, while the suspended sentence has been abolished
in the Australian state of Victoria. The dramatic increase in usage in England
and Wales represents a rare change in the use of a sanction and provokes a
number of important questions, several of which are addressed in this article:
• Has this alternative to institutional imprisonment reduced the use of
immediate terms of custody in England and Wales, as envisaged by
the legislation? Or have we witnessed another example of widening
of the net?
• To what extent do trends in the imposition of SSOs converge or
diverge across offense types and the profiles of those subject to these
sanctions?
• Which kinds of requirements are attached to SSOs, and how do
patterns and trends in SSO requirements compare to those imposed
as part of a community order?
• Has the increase in the number of people sentenced to SSOs
affected breach rates and subsequent admissions to prison?
A. Overview of Article
This article explores recent trends relating to the SSO in England and Wales
and proceeds as follows: Section II briefly summarizes the history of the SSO
and outlines its current form; Section III presents an analysis of the most recent
empirical trends over the period 2000–2017 and addresses key questions arising

5. MARCEL ANCEL, UNIVERSITÉ DE PARIS, SUSPENDED SENTENCES (1971).
6. Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 39; see ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (6th ed. 2015).
7. See infra Table 1.
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from the ongoing critique of the sanction; Section IV outlines some
recommendations for improving the content and implementation of SSOs in
England and Wales and discusses about the role and utility of the sanction in
sentencing regimes; and Section V briefly concludes.
II
THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER: CURRENT STATUTORY REGIME
A. Origins, Evolution, and Structure of the Suspended Sentence
The U.K. Parliament has legislated several key changes to the suspended
sentence regime in place since 1967.8 In 1991, the availability of the SSO was
restricted to exceptional cases. Unsurprisingly, this reform reduced the volume
of such orders imposed from approximately 20,000 in 1990 to only 2500 in 1995.9
Thereafter, the number of SSOs imposed between 1995–2004 remained
relatively stable. The most significant recent reforms arose as a result of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003), which resulted in the wholesale
restructure of penal sanctions implemented in the community.10 Various
community sentences were combined into a single “Community Order,” with
sentencers able to choose from a list of twelve possible requirements. The same
list of requirements was made available for the SSO (discussed further below).
The CJA 2003 also removed the “exceptional circumstances” restriction in
Section 5(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.
In 2012, Parliament increased the length of the immediate prison sentence
that could be suspended from twelve to twenty-four months. The Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO 2012) also
removed the condition that all people serving SSOs must be made the subject of
a requirement.11 The latter amendment was aimed at extending the SSO to
people whose crimes merited a term of custody but who posed a low risk of
serious harm and did not have any particular criminogenic needs that might
otherwise have been addressed by a rehabilitative requirement.12

8. While the Criminal Justice Act 1967 contained a mandatory requirement that all sentences of
imprisonment under six months be suspended unless the case fell within specified exceptions, this fetter
on judicial discretion was abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 1972. The main rationale for the
introduction of the suspended sentence into the sentencing framework at this time was to reduce the
use of short sentences of imprisonment. See Anthony Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in England,
1967–1978, 21 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1981).
9. See GEORGE MAIR, NOEL CROSS & STUART TAYLOR, CTR. FOR CRIME & JUST. STUD., THE
COMMUNITY ORDER AND THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER, THE VIEWS AND ATTITUDES OF
SENTENCERS (2008).
10. Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 § 177(2A).
11. Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, c. 10 § 68.
12. LASPO introduced other, less significant changes to the SSO regime. For example, the
maximum duration of a curfew was extended from six to 12 months, and courts were granted the power
to impose a fine in response to breach instead of activating and imposing a term of immediate
imprisonment.
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The intention of these reforms was to extend the ambit of the SSO and to
provide greater flexibility to courts in their use of the sanction. In fact, Mair,
Cross, and Taylor regard the post-2000 amendments as having essentially
created a brand-new sentence.13 Initial judicial reaction to the changes has been
mixed. Mair et al. report findings from interviews with a small number of
sentencers who were divided on the utility of the new sentence. Approximately
half of the respondents were “generally positive,” while the rest expressed some
reservations, principally in terms of the volume of orders that were being
imposed.
1. Current Structure of the Suspended Sentence Order
The SSO is defined by Section 188 of the CJA 2003. Sentencers may
suspend a sentence of imprisonment of up to two years, and not less than
fourteen days. The sentence may be suspended for a period of between six
months and two years. This is known as the operational period. During the
operational period, if the person subject to the SSO is required to comply with
one or more conditions, these must be completed within a specified time known
as the supervision period. The supervision period must be for at least six
months, and normally the operational and supervision period last for the same
duration. Failure to comply with one or more of the court-ordered
requirements during the supervision period may result in the court activating
the term of imprisonment that was suspended by the original order.14
As with some other sanctions discussed in this special issue,15 an SSO is a
custodial sentence. As an SSO is not a high-end alternative to custody, the
custody threshold must have been crossed prior to the imposition of this
sanction, and the court must have determined that custody is the only option.
As with the original statutory framework of the Canadian conditional sentence,
a court first determines the length of sentence prior to considering whether it
should be suspended. For example, a court may not replace a one-year term of
immediate imprisonment with a two-year suspended sentence order. The terms
of imprisonment must be equivalent in length, whether they are to be served
immediately or suspended. Whether these terms are served immediately or

13. MAIR, CROSS & TAYLOR, supra note 9.
14. The increase in the ceiling of the operational period (from twelve to twenty-four months) was
intended to increase the number of orders in cases where the crime justified imprisonment, but where it
was still not in the public interest to institutionalize the person being sentenced.
15. The SSO is similar to, but also different from, the Conditional Sentence of Imprisonment
(CSI) discussed by Webster and Doob in this issue. See Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob,
Missed Opportunities: Canada’s Experience with the Conditional Sentence, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. no. 1, 2019 at 163. The principal distinction between the two sanctions is that although both are
forms of imprisonment, a person in Canada serving a CSI is serving a sentence of imprisonment.
Someone serving an SSO in England is not actually discharging a sentence of imprisonment. See
JULIAN V. ROBERTS, THE VIRTUAL PRISON: COMMUNITY CUSTODY AND THE EVOLUTION OF
IMPRISONMENT (Alfred Blumstein & David P. Farrington eds., 2004). Conceptually, this means that, if
both sanctions were arrayed along the same vertical scale of severity, the SSO should sit beneath the
CSI, although both are deemed a sentence of imprisonment.
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suspended does, however, result in manifestly different impacts on the lives of
those subject to them, an issue involving penal equivalence to which the article
will return later.
The CJA 2003 enumerates twelve requirements that may be imposed as part
of an SSO. They include: unpaid work; an activity requirement; a program
requirement; a prohibited activity requirement; a curfew; an exclusion
requirement; a residence requirement; a foreign travel prohibition; mental
health; drug and alcohol treatment; a supervision requirement; an attendance
center requirement; and electronic monitoring. The potential requirements
mirror those that may be imposed as part of a community order. The critical
difference between the requirements that may be imposed for the two sanctions
is that all community orders must include a requirement that is imposed for the
purposes of punishment, whereas SSOs do not. As noted, a 2012 reform16
removed the obligation for SSOs to contain a requirement, meaning that a
person subject to an SSO without a requirement must only refrain from further
offending during the operational period to avoid breaching the sanction.
III
RECENT TRENDS IN THE USE OF SUSPENDED SENTENCES
A. Use of Suspended Sentence Orders, 2000–2017
This article focuses on the use of the SSO during the period immediately
prior to and since the 2003 reforms. Table 1 summarizes trends in the use of
principal sanctions across all courts.17 As illustrated in this table, prior to 2004,
the use of the SSO was relatively stable, accounting for only a few thousand
cases and less than 1% of all sanctions imposed. Following the CJA 2003
reform, there was a surge in the volume of SSOs. By 2005, 9666 SSOs were
imposed by the courts; and by 2006, the volume of these orders more than
tripled to 33,509. The number continued to rise over the next decade, peaking
in 2015. In 2017, the most recent year for which data are available, 53,148 SSOs
were imposed, representing 4.4% of all sentenced cases.

16. Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, c. 10 § 68.
17. There are two levels of trial court in England and Wales. All cases originate in the magistrates’
courts and almost all (approximately 95%) are resolved there. The remainder are transferred to the
Crown Court for trial and/or sentencing. The sentencing powers of lower courts are restricted to a
maximum of six months of imprisonment for a single count.
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Ministry of Justice, Sentencing Statistics (Annual), Main bulletin tables, tbl. 1.2 (2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sentencing-statisticsannual-ns [https://perma.cc/8JUF-YU8D]. Ministry of Justice, Offender Management Statistics Quarterly: October to December 2017, Overview
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Table 1: Volumes and Rates of Disposals, all courts, England and Wales, 2000-2017
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There is a similar pattern in the Crown Court, where the most serious cases
are sentenced. The number of SSOs rose from 1539 in 2004 to 20,772 in 2017.
More significantly, the percentage of cases attracting an SSO rose from 2% in
2004 to 27% in 2017. In terms of the percentage of all custodial sentences,
immediate and suspended combined, SSOs accounted for 32% in 2017, up from
3% in 2004.18 This dramatic shift in English sentencing has attracted little
attention from the media, although occasionally tabloid newspapers have
condemned the increased use of suspended sentences, particularly in the
context of violent crimes or persistent offenders. One headline drew attention
to the use of SSOs for repeat offenders: “Almost 12,000 criminals walked free
from court with suspended sentences last year – despite having 10 or more past
convictions.”19
B. Widening of the Net?
Where have all the additional SSOs come from? For decades, scholars have
documented a tendency for the courts to use suspended sentences of
imprisonment in place of high-end community orders, thus undermining the
primary purpose of the sanction—namely, replacing terms of immediate
imprisonment.20 The data summarized in Table 1 suggest that the net-widening
noted by these scholars has persisted. Since the suspended sentence is a form of
custody, which should only be imposed after a court has determined that the
custody threshold has been crossed, the revitalized SSO should have reduced
rates of immediate prison sentences. At least from a long-term perspective, this
appears not to have been the case. The rate of sentences of immediate
imprisonment across all courts remained relatively stable over the period 2004–
2017, from 6.9% to 7.2% of cases. Second, the rate of community orders across
all courts declined 52% over the same period, from 13% of cases in 2004 to
7.9% in 2017. The shifting pattern of sanctions can be seen to an even greater
extent in the Crown Court, where the rate of community orders declined from
30% in 2004 to 6.7% in 2017.

18. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY, Crown Court
data tool (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterlydecember-2017 [https://perma.cc/WNJ5-8X9R].
19. See Daily Mail Reporter, DAILY MAIL, May 10, 2014, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2625103/Almost-12-000-criminals-walk-free-court-suspended-sentences-despite-having-10previous-convictions.html [https://perma.cc/NF7L-EB7F]. To date, the broadsheet newspapers in
England have overlooked this aspect of current sentencing practice.
20. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 318–22 (William Twining,
Christopher McCrudden & Bronwen Morgan eds., 6th ed. 2015); Carol Hedderman & Rebecca Barnes,
Sentencing Women: An Analysis of Recent Trends, in EXPLORING SENTENCING PRACTICE IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 93 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2015); Anthony Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in
England, 1967–1978, 21 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1981). For a review of the international experience
with suspended sentences, see SARAH ARMSTRONG, GILL MCIVOR, FERGUS MCNEILL & PAUL
MCGUINESS, SCOTTISH CTR. FOR CRIME & JUSTICE RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
REVIEW OF CONDITIONAL (SUSPENDED) SENTENCES: FINAL REPORT (2013).
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Data on previous convictions highlights the potential for SSOs to result in
net-widening. As SSOs ought to be imposed only in cases where the offense has
crossed the custody threshold, one might expect the previous convictions
profiles of people sentenced to SSOs to be closer to those receiving immediate
sentences of custody than those receiving community orders. This is not,
however, borne out by the data. In 2016, the previous conviction profiles of
people subject to SSOs were closer to those of people subject to community
orders than those subject to sentences of imprisonment. Moreover, individuals
subject to SSOs actually had fewer previous convictions, on average, than those
subject to community orders.21 This provides a strong indication that individuals
sentenced to SSOs are being drawn primarily from a cohort who, absent the
existence of SSOs, would otherwise have received community orders as
opposed to sentences of immediate imprisonment.
Taking a long-term perspective on sentencing trends and looking across all
courts, however, might serve to mask some notable changes over shorter
periods. Between 2004 and 2007 in the Crown Court, for example, there does
appear to have been a significant degree of decarceration associated with the
initial rise of suspended sentences. While 61% of cases received a sentence of
immediate imprisonment in 2004, this had declined to 56% by 2007.22 During
the same period, suspended sentences rose from 2% to 19% of all cases.
Although this indicates some degree of decarceration, net-widening also
appeared to take place during this time, as the rate of community orders
declined from 30% to 18%.
Finally, an indication of both decarceration and net-widening can be seen by
looking at the correlation coefficients for SSOs and community orders, and
SSOs and sentences of immediate imprisonment. Between 2004–2017, across all
courts, there was a moderate to strong negative relationship between both SSOs
and community orders (-.68) and SSOs and sentences of immediate
imprisonment (-.62).23 While these coefficients, as well as the aggregate statistics
discussed above, provide preliminary indications of the likely impact of SSOs
on other disposals, they do not account for any potential exogenous factors that
might mediate these relationships. To estimate more precisely the extent to
which SSOs have led to decarceration or net-widening, further in-depth analysis
21. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT STATISTICS QUARTERLY: OCTOBER TO
DECEMBER
2016,
Offending
History
Data
Tool:
Sanction
tatistics
(2017)
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-october-todecember-2016 [https://perma.cc/4269-FFE2].
22. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER
2014, Crown Court data tool (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-systemstatistics-quarterly-december-2014 [https://perma.cc/6RZY-KMMZ].
23. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER
2017, Overview tables (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-systemstatistics-quarterly-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/JF86-P33A]; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 2014, Overview tables (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-december-2014
[https://perma.cc/TGM2-H3K2].
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of sentencing trends is needed. This research should control for exogeneous
factors, such as shifts in the rates of different offence types coming before the
courts.
To the extent that net-widening has occurred over the period 2004–2017, the
cause is puzzling. It is unclear why a court, liberated from using an SSO except
in exceptional circumstances, would turn its attention to cases formerly
sentenced to a community order, particularly in light of the guidance issued by
the Sentencing Guidelines Council in 2004.24 Low levels of judicial confidence in
community orders may supply part of the answer.
Community penalties have struggled to attract the confidence of the courts
or the legislature in England and Wales. One manifestation of this lack of
confidence is the reform introduced in 2003 when Parliament legislated that all
community orders must contain at least one requirement imposed for the
purposes of punishment.25 This controversial step was taken in order to correct
a perception that community orders were purely rehabilitative in nature and
had no punitive impact on those receiving them. If courts did lack confidence in
even high-end community orders with many demanding requirements, the new
freedom to impose instead a term of imprisonment, albeit suspended, might
have proved welcome—hence the increase in SSOs accompanied by a
simultaneous drop in the volume of community orders.
1. Guideline on the Use of Suspended Sentence Orders
These data, suggesting that courts were using the SSO for cases which might
otherwise have attracted a community order rather than immediate
imprisonment, demonstrate that previous guidance has failed to correct a longstanding misapplication of the sanction. In 2004, the Sentencing Guidelines
Council, the statutory body responsible for issuing sentencing guidelines at the
time, issued a guideline for a number of sanctions, including the newly amended
SSO. That guideline stressed that, prior to imposing an SSO, courts must
already have decided that a prison sentence is justified, with the clear
implication that an SSO would replace a term of immediate imprisonment and
not a community order.26 This guidance appears to have fallen on deaf ears.
Awareness of the continuing misapplication of the suspended sentence
order led the Sentencing Council of England and Wales (SCEW) to issue
further guidance on the use of this and other sanctions.27 In 2016, the SCEW

24. NEW SENTENCES: CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003, § 2.2.12 (SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COUNCIL 2003).
25. Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 § 177(2A).
26. NEW SENTENCES: CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003, § 2.2.12 (SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COUNCIL 2003).
27. The Sentencing Council issues offense-specific and generic guidelines, and all courts have a
statutory duty to follow any relevant guideline unless it “would be contrary to the interests of justice to
do so.” Coroners and Justice Act 2009, c. 25 § 125(1). See Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines and
Judicial Discretion: Evolution of the Duty of Courts to Comply in England and Wales, 51 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2011).
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issued a definitive guideline for the use of principal sanctions, including the
SSO.28 The guideline, applicable to anyone sentenced on or after February 1,
2017, makes it clear that an SSO should not be imposed in place of anything
other than a term of immediate custody:
A suspended sentence MUST NOT be imposed as a more severe form of community
order. A suspended sentence is a custodial sentence. Sentencers should be clear that
they would impose an immediate custodial sentence if the power to suspend were not
available. If not, a non-custodial sentence should be imposed.29

The guideline also provides some guidance regarding the factors that should
incline a court towards or away from a suspended sentence, if the custody
threshold has been passed.30 The most recent development came in May 2018,
when the Chair of the Sentencing Council sent a memo to courts across the
country warning them against imposing the SSO as a more severe form of
community order.31 While the next batch of sentencing statistics is required
before the likely impact of these interventions becomes apparent, data from
2017 provide a preliminary indication that the interventions may be having their
desired effects: across all courts, there was a marginal fall in the rates of SSOs
and sentences of immediate imprisonment, accompanied by a deceleration in
the decline of community orders.
C. Profiles of People Receiving an SSO
The increase in SSOs was relatively consistent for males and females. In
2000, 1% of both males and females received an SSO.32 In 2017, 17% of males
and 19% of females convicted of indictable offenses across all courts received
an SSO.33 This finding—that the SSO is being used at similar rates for males and
females—is consistent with earlier research.34 The absence of any significant
divergence is surprising since the SSO is particularly appropriate for those
28. IMPOSITION OF COMMUNITY AND CUSTODIAL SENTENCES. DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE
(SENTENCING COUNCIL FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 2017).
29. Id. at 7.
30. There are three factors cited that oppose the use of an SSO: offender poses a risk; only
immediate imprisonment is sufficient; and the offender has a history of noncompliance. Similarly, three
factors that should incline a court to impose the order are also cited: a realistic prospect of
rehabilitation; strong person mitigation; and immediate custody would result in significant harmful
impact upon others. See IMPOSITION OF COMMUNITY AND CUSTODIAL SENTENCES DEFINITIVE
GUIDELINE, p. 8 (SENTENCING COUNCIL FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 2017).
31. In his letter, the Chairman noted that: “There is evidence that suspended sentence orders,
which are custodial sentences, are sometimes being imposed incorrectly as a more severe form of
community order.” See Letter from Lord Justice Treacy, Chairman of the Sentencing Council for
England and Wales, to John Witherow, Editor, The Times, (May 2, 2018).
32. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING STATISTICS (ANNUAL), Sentencing Statistics
supplementary tables (2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sentencing-statistics-annual-ns
[https://perma.cc/U7G8-C4W4].
33. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER
2017, Outcomes by offence tool (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justicesystem-statistics-quarterly-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/AHK7-BWCH].
34. SUNITA PATEL & STEPHEN STANLEY, CTR. FOR CRIME & JUSTICE STUDIES, THE USE OF
THE COMMUNITY ORDER AND THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER FOR WOMEN (2008).
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convicted of an offense of sufficient seriousness to justify custody, but where
there is significant personal mitigation or where immediate custody would have
a significant harmful impact upon others. Being a primary caregiver for young
children is one common such factor, and women are significantly more likely to
be in this position.35
As shown in Table 2, in 2017, across all courts and in relation to indictable
offenses, the highest rates of SSOs relative to other disposals were imposed for
violent offenses (24%), possession of weapons (27%), and fraud (26%). The
lowest rates of SSOs were imposed for robbery (6%), drug offenses (11%), and
theft (13%). These patterns were relatively similar for males and females.36

35. STATISTA, Lone Parent Families in the United Kingdom 2017, by Parent’s Gender (2018)
https://www.statista.com/statistics/281640/lone-parent-families-in-the-united-kingdom-uk-by-gender/
[https://perma.cc/UM49-5SNU].
36. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 2017,
Outcomes by offence tool (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-systemstatistics-quarterly-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/KEU7-D8EY].
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MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 2014, Outcomes by offence tool
(2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-december-2014
[https://perma.cc/RQ4F-UTHR]. Ministry OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 2017,
Outcomes by offence tool (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterlydecember-2017 [https://perma.cc/KEU7-D8EY].

All Indictable Offenses

Fraud Offenses

Miscellaneous Crimes Against Society

Public Order Offenses

Possession of Weapons

Drug Offenses

Criminal Damage & Arson

Robbery

Theft Offenses
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2005

148

Sexual Offenses

Violence

2004

Table 2: Percent of indictable offenses resulting in Suspended Sentence Orders by offence
group, all courts, 2004-2017
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D. Analysis of the Requirements Attached to Suspended Sentence Orders
One critical issue relating to noncustodial sentences in various jurisdictions
is the nature and onerousness of the requirements attached to sanctions
implemented in the community. A recurring criticism of community penalties,
conditional sentences of imprisonment, and suspended sentences is that the
absence of demanding conditions diminishes the penal weight and character of
the sanction. This criticism is particularly acute with respect to sanctions such as
the Canadian conditional sentence and the English SSO since both are
considered forms of imprisonment, rather than alternatives to custody.37 A
common critique of both sanctions is that they carry minimal penal weight and
are not, therefore, equivalent to the sentence of custody that they displace. If
this is true, the imposition of an SSO in place of immediate imprisonment is
likely to undermine parity and proportionality as well as public confidence in
the sanction more generally.
Table 3 summarizes the pattern of requirements attached to an SSO in 2010
and 2017. The vast majority of SSOs have either one or two requirements
attached to them. The most prevalent of these requirements by far are
supervision and unpaid work. It is important to note that the Offender
Rehabilitation Act 201438 introduced the Rehabilitation Activity Requirement
to replace both the supervision and specific activity requirements, which
accounts for the significant decline of the latter between 2010 and 2017.
Interestingly, the provisions in LASPO 2012, which enabled SSOs to be
imposed without specific requirements beyond the condition not to commit a
further offense, did not result in any significant change in the average number
of requirements attached to SSOs, indicating that the courts are handing down
relatively few requirement-free SSOs.
Many of the potential requirements are used sparingly. Table 3 shows that
even those addressing common criminogenic triggers, such as alcohol and drug
treatment, were attached in fewer than 10% of all cases. The 2017 data reveal
no significant difference between the types of requirement attached to SSOs
and those attached to community orders. Similarly, the same dataset shows no
significant difference between the number of requirements attached to SSOs,
averaging 1.6, and the number attached to community orders, averaging 1.5.39

37. Although as noted the CSI is actually discharged whereas the SSO is suspended.
38. Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014, c. 11, sch. 5 (Eng).
39. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT STATISTICS QUARTERLY: OCTOBER TO
DECEMBER 2017 (2018). https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statisticsquarterly-october-to-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/AZ7M-FWEZ].
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Table 3: Requirements attached to a Suspended Sentence Order, 2010 and 2017
2010
Supervision
Rehabilitation Activity
Requirement
Unpaid Work
Accredited Program
Curfew
Specified Activity
Drug Treatment
Alcohol Treatment
Other requirements (including
prohibited activity; exclusion;
mental health; electronic
monitoring; attendance center
and residential requirements)

2017
66%
--%

5%
65%

50%
23%
17%
10%
8%
5%
<1%

47%
14%
16%
<1%
8%
1%
<1%

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT STATISTICS QUARTERLY: OCTOBER TO
DECEMBER 2017, Probation: 2017, tbl. A4.10 (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/
offender-management-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/DY4Q-SALY]
(percentages rounded).

One explanation for the relatively low use of some requirements,
particularly drug and treatment orders, is judicial awareness of the likelihood of
noncompliance leading to breach and committal to custody.40 Probation officers
overseeing the implementation of SSOs have also highlighted that while many
requirements—such as alcohol treatment, attendance center requirements and
mental health treatment requirements—are available in theory, they have been
unavailable in practice due to a lack of resources.41 Probation officers have
reported this being a particular cause for concern given the links between their
clients’ offending behavior and problems around alcohol abuse and mental
health. By diminishing their penal character, the relatively low number of
requirements attached to SSOs—whether for reasons of breach or lack of
availability—is likely to undermine public, political, and judicial confidence in
the sanction.42

40. GEORGE MAIR, NOEL CROSS & STUART TAYLOR, CTR. FOR CRIME & JUSTICE STUDIES,
THE USE AND IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY ORDER AND THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER 28
(2007).
41. Id.
42. See infra Section IV.
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E. Compliance, Breach, and Deterrence
An important concern arising from the use of SSOs, particularly if a
significant proportion draw upon cases that would otherwise have received
community orders, is the rate at which these orders are breached and
terminated early. If SSOs are associated with a high termination rate for breach,
the prison population will increase accordingly. The termination rate is likely to
be affected by the ambit of the sanction and its use by the courts. A highly
selective application is likely to result in a low breach rate, as courts select
primarily the lowest-risk cases for an SSO. As the ambit broadens, so too may
the volume of higher-risk cases. This is notable in light of the recent 2012
reform, which raised the cap on terms of imprisonment that SSOs can displace
from one to two years.
Before reviewing trends in SSO termination and compliance rates, it is
useful to place breach statistics in a wider context of recidivism research. The
U.K. Ministry of Justice has conducted extensive multivariate research to
explore the relationship between different sanctions and recidivism rates.43
More specifically, the research compared recidivism rates for short custodial
sentences, SSOs, and community orders, using a large cohort and applying
propensity score matching. Results demonstrate that people sentenced to an
SSO had the lowest recidivism rates of the three sanctions, with the greatest
difference in rates emerging between immediate custody and SSOs. For each
cohort studied, the one-year reoffending rate was highest for those sentenced to
short-term custody. Similar trends have emerged in other jurisdictions. Lulham,
Weatherburn, and Bartels report data from New South Wales showing that,
after matching for key background variables, people sentenced to prison
reoffended more quickly after release than comparable individuals sentenced to
a suspended sentence.44
In England and Wales, the escalating use of the SSO between 2006 and 2017
was accompanied by a significant decline in breach rates for both
noncompliance with SSO conditions and conviction for a subsequent offense. In
2006, over half of SSOs were terminated for either noncompliance or
reconviction. By 2017, this had declined to less than a third. The most
significant decline occurred in relation to breach rates for noncompliance: from
a high of 28% in 2006, breach rates for noncompliance dropped to 12% in 2009
and remained relatively stable thereafter. Concomitantly, the percentage of
SSOs that ran their full course or were terminated early for good progress rose
dramatically, from 37% in 2006 to 71% in 2017.45 These trends suggest that the
increase in the use of SSOs has not created a significant additional threat to the
community.
43. AIDAN MEWS ET AL., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF SHORT CUSTODIAL SENTENCES,
COMMUNITY ORDERS AND SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDERS ON RE-OFFENDING (2015).
44. Rohan Lulham, Don Weatherburn & Lorana Bartels, The Recidivism of Offenders Given
Suspended Sentences: A Comparison With Full-Time Imprisonment, 136 CRIME & JUST. BULL. 1 (2009).
45. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 39.
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To the extent that burgeoning SSO caseloads reflect an increase in the
number of people who would otherwise have received community orders,
probation officers tasked with responding to noncompliance might have been
reluctant to instigate breach proceedings with the knowledge that these people
would likely be sent to prison to serve their sentence.46 Indeed, research on
penal sanctions implemented in the community has highlighted that rates of
compliance may be more dependent on particular compliance policies and
professional discretion than the actual behavior of those subject to these
sanctions.47 Given that the decline in rates of compliance occurred at the same
time as a significant shift in the profiles of those receiving SSOs, however,
compliance rates might also have been shaped to some extent by a shift in the
overall propensity of this cohort to comply with the conditions of these
sentences.
Deterrence is not cited as a justification for the imposition of SSOs over and
above other disposals in current U.K. legislation or SCEW guidance. The
potential for these sentences to deter people from reoffending has, however,
been noted by U.K. politicians, as well as by researchers and legislators in other
jurisdictions.48 It is, therefore, worth examining the links between the severity of
SSOs and the likelihood of noncompliance and reconviction. A Freedom of
Information Act Request revealing data on SSO terminations between 2012–
2016 showed little variation in termination rates over time. 49 This provides a
preliminary indication that the LASPO 2012 provisions enabling courts to
impose fines upon breach, as opposed to termination and activation, has not
had a significant impact in practice. SSO termination rates varied widely across
different offense categories. In 2016, for example, the highest termination rate
for reconvictions and noncompliance combined was 52% for theft and handling
offenses, compared to only 13% for sexual offenses.
The same data provide an insight, albeit limited, into the potential
differential deterrent effect of SSOs based on their severity. Dividing SSOs into
a relatively lenient category, under one-year custodial term, and a relatively
severe category, one-year and over custodial term, revealed considerable
variation in noncompliance and reconviction rates. In relation to
noncompliance with SSO conditions, there is a higher termination rate
associated with the relatively lenient category of SSOs. For SSOs with a
custodial term of under one year imposed for burglary offenses, for example,
the termination rate for noncompliance was 19%. In contrast, for SSOs with a
46. See GEORGE MAIR & HELEN MILLS, CTR. FOR CRIME & JUSTICE STUDIES, THE
COMMUNITY ORDER AND THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER THREE YEARS ON: THE VIEWS AND
EXPERIENCES OF PROBATION OFFICERS AND OFFENDERS (2009).
47. Gwen Robinson, What Counts? Community Sanctions and the Construction of Compliance, in
WHAT WORKS IN OFFENDER COMPLIANCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE 26 (Pamela Ugwudike & Peter Raynor eds., 2013).
48. Loraine Bartels, The Weight of the Sword of Damocles: A Reconviction Analysis of Suspended
Sentences in Tasmania, 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 72 (2009).
49. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST 180307001 (2018).
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custodial term of one year and over, the termination rate for noncompliance
was just 13%. For violent offenses, the figures were 11% and 8% respectively.
It is of course possible that these findings are not the product of an
enhanced deterrent effect associated with longer SSOs, but of professional
discretion in enforcement of noncompliance—specifically, the reluctance of
probation officers to breach an SSO that will result in relatively severe
consequences for the person serving it. However, there is a similar pattern in
relation to breach and revocation for further offenses. For SSOs with a
custodial term of under one year imposed for violent offenses, 17% were
terminated for a further offense, whereas for those with a custodial term of one
year and over, the termination rate was just 12%. For burglary offenses, the
figures were 26% and 20% respectively. Comparable patterns were observed
across other offense types.
Had the differences in breach and revocation rates been found only in
relation to noncompliance, these may have been attributable solely to variation
in the way professionals exercised their discretion around enforcement. Given
that the same pattern was found in relation to further offenses, however, the
data on SSO breach and revocation provide at least a preliminary indication
that relatively lengthy and severe SSOs may exert an enhanced deterrent effect
in relation to both reoffending and noncompliance. Further analysis controlling
for factors such as the differential offending profiles of those subject to SSOs,
however, is needed to scrutinize these statistics and control for exogenous
factors that could be contributing to the observed variation.
IV
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
A. Summary
Between 2004–2017, the volume and rate of SSOs increased rapidly. While
the aggregate sentencing statistics indicate that the initial expansion of SSOs led
to the displacement of sentences of immediate imprisonment, constituting a
process of decarceration, in the years that followed SSOs increasingly appeared
to displace community orders, constituting net-widening. Further in-depth
analysis controlling for shifts in offense types and examining short-term trends
is required before definitive conclusions can be drawn on this issue.
The requirements attached to SSOs are broadly similar to those attached to
community orders: the vast majority of both contain either one or two
requirements. By far the most prevalent of these requirements are supervision
and unpaid work. There is little difference in the rates at which courts impose
SSOs on males and females.
Rates of compliance across SSOs and community orders are broadly
comparable, with successful completion rates for SSOs increasing markedly
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between 2006 (37%) and 2017 (71%).50 This is likely to reflect changes in
compliance policies and practices, as opposed to any substantive change in the
behavior of those subject to these sanctions. Terminations rates for
noncompliance vary widely depending on offense type: for example, in 2016,
theft and handling offenses had a relatively high termination rate of 52%,
whereas the termination rate for sexual offenses was just 13%. Although
further analysis controlling for exogenous factors is needed before firm
conclusions can be drawn, the available data provide a preliminary indication
that relatively severe SSOs might lead to lower termination rates for
noncompliance and new offenses compared to relatively lenient SSOs.
B. Finding a Place for the Suspended Sentence Order
The evidence discussed in this article suggests that the courts in England and
Wales have often misapplied the SSO, displacing community orders instead of
sentences of immediate imprisonment. However, this article does not endorse
the abolitionist position taken in Victoria, Australia.51 The question is whether
there is some penal space for the SSO between an executed custodial sentence
and a noncustodial sanction. This article proposes that there is a role for a
sanction of this kind within the sentencer’s toolkit, and argues that there are
crimes of sufficient seriousness to justify imprisonment, but which are
committed under particular circumstances, or by particular people, which justify
suspension of the sentence. It seems excessively restrictive to argue that because
imprisonment is justified, it must also be executed.
Few sanctions have attracted as much criticism over the years as the
suspended sentence. Moreover, such criticism has emerged from academics,52 as
well as the mass media,53 politicians, and lobby groups. A central element of
most critiques is that the suspended sentence is a deceptive sanction: while it
represents itself as a form of imprisonment—with the statutory framework and
legal guidance treating it as a term of custody—it falls short of having the same
impact on the lives of those subject to it. Other, similar forms of suspended
sanction attract a comparable degree of criticism. The most common criticism of
the conditional sentences of imprisonment in Canada was that someone serving
a CSI was deemed to be serving a sentence of imprisonment, when in fact they
spent their sentence in their own home.54

50. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 39.
51. See Arei Freiberg, Suspended Sentences in Australia: Uncertain, Unstable, Unpopular and
Unnecessary?, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2019 at 81.
52. E.g., Mirko Bagaric, Suspended Sentences and Preventive Sentences: Illusory Evils and
Disproportionate Punishments, U. N.S.W. L.J. 534 (1999); Freiberg, supra note 51. For a recent and
comprehensive discussion of the suspended sentence, see Tom O’Malley, That Measure of Wise
Clemency: Defending the Suspended Sentence, 28 IRISH CRIM. L.J. 39 (2018).
53. See supra note 19.
54. See Webster & Doob, supra note 15.
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One of the objectives of the Supreme Court judgment in Proulx55 was to
ensure a closer correspondence between the onerousness of a conditional
sentence and the term of immediate custody that it had replaced. That
judgment directed courts to ensure that all conditional sentences should carry
punitive conditions; conditions designed to promote rehabilitation or
restorative justice were insufficient. In addition, the Court abandoned the oneto-one correspondence between a conditional sentence and the term of
institutional imprisonment it replaced. Henceforth a court could impose, for
example, an eighteen-month conditional sentence instead of a six-month term
of custody.56
Penal interventions need to be diverse and protean. The diversity of
offending and of those sentenced requires sanctions that permit a high degree
of individualization. A sanction regime with only a limited number of penalties,
for example, a fine, probation, or prison, would lack the necessary flexibility.
There is a clear a priori attraction to creating a wide range of sanctions for
courts to deploy at sentencing. To this we add two caveats. First, all sanctions
need to carry a degree of what we might call penal validity: they need to affect
the person subject to them in a way that the community would expect; or at
least, sanctions cannot have an impact greatly at odds with community
expectations. Imagine the following regime of fines. A person is ordered to pay
£5,000, a sum which is commensurate with the gravity of their conduct and their
means to pay. However, the payment may be made at any point up to ten years
after it is imposed, and the person subject to the fine may reduce their financial
liability by applying a wide range of income-tax deductions (for children;
mortgage relief, etc.). A fine implemented in this form would lack penal validity
as a sanction.57 Equally, a suspended sentence regime must attract the
confidence of the community, or it will be less likely to be used by courts.
1. Suspended Sentence Orders and the Principle of Penal Restraint
It is important to note a foundational sentencing principle that underpins
the use of sanctions such as the SSO: the principle of penal restraint, or
parsimony at sentencing. This principle requires that the courts should impose
the least onerous sanction that achieves the purposes of sentencing. The
principle of penal restraint has been placed on a statutory footing in a wide
range of common law jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the principle is
reflected in the statutory requirement that imprisonment be imposed only if no
lesser sentence is appropriate: “The court must not pass a custodial sentence
unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or the combination of the offence

55. R. v. Proulx, [2000] S.C.R. 61 (Can.).
56. See Julian V. Roberts & Patrick Healy, Recent Developments in Conditional Sentencing, 80
CANADIAN B. REV. 1035 (2001).
57. A more realistic example would be a regime where the maximum fine was, say $100. Few
employed offenders would experience any discomfort.
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and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine
alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.”58
The Canadian version of the restraint principle is at once clearer and more
relevant to the use of different sanctions, including an SSO: Sections 718.2(d)(e) of the Criminal Code states that “an offender should not be deprived of
liberty, if less restrictive alternatives may be appropriate in the circumstances;
and (e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment should be considered
for all offenders.” This wording focuses a court’s attention on the sanctions less
severe than immediate imprisonment, including forms of imprisonment that are
either suspended, as in England and Wales, or served in the community as a
conditional sentence of imprisonment, as in Canada.
Restraint is a simple principle, albeit one that is a challenge to
operationalize. The academic critique of the custody threshold in this
jurisdiction is that it is insufficiently robust to prevent the imposition of custody
in cases where a noncustodial alternative would be sufficient.59 Providing courts
with a multiplicity of sanctions is one way of promoting the application of the
restraint principle. An SSO offers an additional option to courts contemplating
cases that have only just passed the custody threshold or that are more serious
but where there are unusual or particularly compelling sources of mitigation.
Cases in the first category are particularly appropriate candidates as they would
involve relatively short sentences of imprisonment which can be readily
replaced by an SSO. Seen in this light, the SSO contributes to promoting
restraint and to underscoring the message that institutional imprisonment
should be reserved for those who represent a significant risk or those convicted
of a crime the gravity of which means that a noncustodial alternative would
entail a violation of ordinal proportionality requirements.
C. Reforming the Current Regime in England and Wales
We now offer two main reforms to ensure the SSO fulfills its primary
purpose of reducing the number of short custodial sentences,60 while also
attracting the confidence of all stakeholders.
1. Enhancing the Operational Period of the SSO
Since the SSO purports to be a sentence of imprisonment, its legitimacy is
put at risk if these orders are perceived to be a soft option that entail
significantly less punitive weight than the immediate sentences of imprisonment
they are designed to displace. Central to our recommendations, therefore, is a
requirement that the SSO carry a degree of penal validity, in terms of its

58. Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 § 152(2).
59. See Nicola Padfield, Time to Bury the Custody Threshold?, 8 CRIM. L. REV. 593 (2011); Julian
V. Roberts & Lyndon Harris, Reconceptualizing the Custody Threshold in England and Wales, 28
CRIM. L.F. 477 (2017).
60. HOUSE OF COMMONS JUSTICE COMMITTEE, TOWARDS EFFECTIVE SENTENCING: FIFTH
REPORT OF SESSION 2007–08 VOLUME 1, 2008, HC 186–I (2008).
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statutory platform, its impact on the person subject to it, and its relation to
other sanctions.
In this regard, the experience with an ancillary sanction in Canada, the CSI,
is instructive. The original statutory framework, which determined the nature of
conditional sentences actually imposed and served, was flawed and rightly
attracted much public and media criticism. One obvious weakness of the
legislation was that a CSI had to be the same length as the term of institutional
imprisonment it replaced. Since time at home is unlikely to carry the same
punitive weight as time in a penal institution, this one-to-one correspondence
was potentially fatal to the public image of the sanction, as well as the principle
of parity at sentencing.61 The appellate courts were not slow to react to the
problem. In a guideline judgment in 2001, the Supreme Court decoupled the
length of a CSI from the term of straight imprisonment it would replace.62
This approach could be followed in England and Wales. Courts could be
allowed to enhance the length of SSOs so that they exceed the duration of the
immediate sentences of imprisonment they displace. One of the potential issues
with this option, however, would be the consequences of breach and
termination of the SSO. Consider the case of someone convicted of domestic
burglary warranting a two-year sentence of immediate imprisonment, but for
which the judge has reason to suspend the sentence. If the suspended term of
custody was enhanced to three years and the person breached the SSO within a
week of its commencement, would it be just to subject them to three years of
imprisonment, given that the original offence warranted only a two-year prison
sentence?
An alternative, of which we are in favor, would be to leave unchanged the
suspended term of imprisonment, but to enhance the SSO’s operational period.
While it is difficult to compare the punitive bite of time served in custody with
time served in the community, we suggest that a 1:2 ratio of imprisonment
versus time served in the community is straightforward and likely to command
greater public and court confidence than the current legislation that gives courts
the discretion to suspend SSOs for any period not less than six months and not
more than two years. Guidance from the Sentencing Council suggests that the
operational period should reflect the length of the sentence, citing an example
that echoes our suggested 1:2 ratio. However, we would highlight that the courts
are not bound by this ratio, nor indeed are they currently able to impose an
operational period twice the length of the custodial term they are displacing in
cases where this term exceeds one year.63

61. We use the term “unlikely” advisedly because there will be cases where the subjective
experience of a CSI is the equivalent of a term of immediate imprisonment. See discussion in Roberts &
Healy, supra note 56. In all likelihood the same cannot be said for the SSO in England and Wales.
62. R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61.
63. The current maximum limit that restricts operational periods to a duration of no more than
two years means that for any custodial term over one year that is suspended, an operational period
twice this length is not possible under the current regime.
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In England and Wales, people subject to determinate sentences of
imprisonment serve half of their sentence in custody and half in the community
subject to post-custodial license conditions. Therefore, a person sentenced to
two years of immediate imprisonment for domestic burglary would be required
to serve one year in custody and one year in the community on license. Our
proposal is that, if sentences are to be suspended, the operational period ought
to last twice as long as the period of imprisonment, plus the equivalent
additional time the person would have spent in the community subject to postcustodial license conditions. In relation to our hypothetical domestic burglary
case, therefore, this would translate to a suspended sentence with a two-year
term of imprisonment and an operational period of three years (as opposed to
the likely two-year operational period under the current sentencing
framework).
What might the likely consequences of an enhanced operational period be?
First and foremost, it would increase the severity of the SSO. In this particular
case, not only would the person subject to the SSO be required to abide by
certain conditions in the community for an additional year, but during this time
they would also be subject to breach and the possibility of imprisonment for the
remainder of the sentence. Regarding our current case of someone convicted of
domestic burglary and sentenced to a two-year term of imprisonment with an
operational period of three years, how much time in custody ought the person
serve if they breach the SSO after precisely one year? One straightforward
approach would be to allow every two months served in the community—
subject to the SSO—to equate to one month of imprisonment. This mirrors our
suggestion that the operational period ought to last for double the length of the
term of custody that would have been imposed had the sentence not been
suspended. In relation to our example, therefore, if the SSO was breached after
one year, the person who had breached the order would be required to serve a
remaining six months in prison following termination, plus the additional twelve
months subject to post-custodial license conditions, which would have been
required had the sentence not been suspended.
This recommendation, which we argue would bring the SSO more into line
with the penal weight of the immediate terms of imprisonment these orders are
designed to replace, is quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. The precise
penal character of SSOs, however, depends not only on the duration of the
operational period, but on the specific requirements attached to these orders.
Nevertheless, we think it is appropriate that the courts and other criminal
justice professionals retain the authority and discretion to shape the precise
content of SSOs. While we do not favor an approach that mandates a specific
number of requirements being attached to these orders, our second
recommendation is designed to enhance the availability, and consequently the
take-up, of rehabilitative requirements in particular.
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2. Increase Investment in the Quality and Administration of SSOs
Given an average annual cost of imprisonment of around £35,000 per person
and an average annual cost of SSOs of around £4,300 per person,64 our
proposals would continue to see SSOs costing the state significantly less than
the sentences of immediate imprisonment they are designed to replace. Indeed,
the additional costs of the enhanced operational periods may ultimately reduce
costs, if they lead to the courts applying these sentences correctly and as they
were originally intended: in place of sentences of immediate imprisonment as
opposed to community orders. To reiterate, one of the likely reasons for the
net-widening process described in this article is potential for the courts to
perceive SSOs as lacking a level of punitive weight broadly equivalent to
immediate sentences of imprisonment. As a result, the courts have largely used
SSOs to displace community orders. If SSOs are revised so that their
operational period is double that of the custodial term they are displacing—plus
the additional period of time people would otherwise have served subject to
post-custodial license in the community—it seems reasonable to expect that the
courts will be more willing to use the SSOs as intended.
In light of the considerable cost differentials, we think there is a strong case
for investing additional money to enhance the quality and administration of
SSOs. For example, as noted above, some of the requirements that are available
in theory—such as alcohol treatment, attendance center requirements, and
mental health treatment requirements—are unavailable in practice due to a lack
of resources. As addressing problems around mental health and substance
abuse can be integral to supporting people to refrain from crime,65 it would be
prudent to use a proportion of the savings gained from displacing sentences of
immediate imprisonment with SSOs to better fund and thereby increase the
availability of these rehabilitative requirements.
Increasing the availability of rehabilitative requirements not only has the
potential to bring about reductions in reoffending, but also to enhance public
and judicial confidence in these sanctions. Indeed, there are some notable
examples of deterrence-based strategies being used in conjunction with the
provision of considerable levels of training, employment and other forms of
support, to divert people away from crime.66 SSOs have the potential to
function in a similar manner to reduce the likelihood of reoffending, combining
the deterrent threat of SSO termination, and consequent time in prison, with an
enhanced level of support that better funded SSOs might provide in the
64. NATIONAL
AUDIT
OFFICE,
PROBATION:
LANDSCAPE
REVIEW
(2014)
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Probation-landscape-review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TPJ9-8ABZ]; PRISON REFORM TRUST, PRISON: THE FACTS: BROMLEY BRIEFINGS
SUMMER 2017 (2017).
65. Marie Needham et al., Association Between Three Different Cognitive Behavioral Alcohol
Treatment Programs and Recidivism Rates Among Male Offenders: Findings From The United
Kingdom, 39 ALCOHOL, CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 1100 (2015).
66. Anthony Braga & David Weisburd, The Effects of ‘Pulling Levers’ Focused Deterrence
Strategies on Crime, 8 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1 (2012).
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community. The broad and inclusive approach to sentencing rationales
promoted by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Section 142(1) provides ample
support for penal sanctions that attempt to reduce crime through deterrence,
reform, and rehabilitation.
D. Drawing Lessons from the English Experience
The literature on the suspended sentence makes it clear that the structure of
any such sanction, as well as its interaction with the sentencing regime in which
it is embedded, determines its success or failure. A suspended sentence that
works in one jurisdiction may fail in another. Unlike institutional imprisonment,
the contours of which are relatively constant, the penological context of
suspended sentences varies greatly. This may explain why the Australian
versions have foundered while the English equivalent has flourished.67
The experience in England makes it clear that a suspended sentence of
imprisonment can be accommodated within the range of judicial options at
sentencing. Critics of suspended sentences might have predicted a number of
negative outcomes as a result of such a striking and sudden shift in sentencing
practices, including an increase in crime and reoffending rates, widespread
public opposition to the expanded use of the sanction, and a significant drop in
the use of community orders as a result of net-widening. Two of these problems
have not arisen to any significant degree; the latter requires further analysis
before conclusions can be drawn with any confidence. Crime rates have been
falling in recent years, while there has been little change in reoffending rates.
Although no study has explicitly explored public reaction to the use of
suspended sentences, the level of public confidence in sentencing increased
during the period in which the volume of suspended sentences rose. In relation
to the issue of net-widening, the evidence suggests an initial decarceration effect
when the CJA 2003 removed the “exceptional circumstances” provision from
the imposition of SSOs. While net-widening also appears to have taken place,
the picture is not straightforward; in-depth scrutiny of sentencing data in the
coming years is required before firm conclusions can be drawn on this issue.
It is all very well to emphasize the conceptual complexities and legislative
deficiencies of a given sanction, but perhaps it is worth considering one of the
individuals on whom this order has been imposed. Sara Smith68 was convicted of
excise tax evasion amounting to approximately £70,000, arising from a family
business in which she had repeatedly made trips to the continent, returning with
goods the value of which was not fully declared. Sara was a young mother with
three young children, of whom one was an infant, and another had special
needs. She had no prior convictions. At the time of sentencing, an SSO was only
available if the court decided it was justified by exceptional circumstances. In
light of the seriousness of the fraud and related aggravating factors, the trial

67. Freiberg, supra note 51.
68. R. v. Smith (Sara Jane) [2001] EWCA Crim 1476.
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judge imposed twelve months immediate custody. Smith appealed her sentence,
but the Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant’s circumstances were not
exceptional and therefore upheld the term of immediate imprisonment.
The defendant in this case was not a small fish caught up in the everwidening net created by a reformed sanction: she was an individual heading for
prison, with the suspended sentence seen as a last resort. If an individual with
this profile were sentenced today, it seems highly likely that the trial court
would have imposed an SSO to prevent the defendant’s children being deprived
of their mother as a result of her imprisonment.69 In the present penal climate,
courts are unlikely to impose a community order in a case of this nature; the
custody threshold would clearly be perceived to have been crossed.70 Returning
to the previous “only in exceptional circumstances” regime, or abolishing the
SSO altogether, would inevitably mean this woman would enter prison. This
case illustrates both the current utility of a suspended sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the wisdom of removing the exceptional circumstance
requirement.
V
CONCLUSION
Suspended sentences have the potential to play an important role in
enabling courts to avoid institutionalizing people for relatively short terms of
imprisonment. In order to do so, however, they must command the confidence
of sentencers and a range of other stakeholders. The intention of our proposals
is not to fundamentally alter the overall severity of sentencing in England and
Wales, but to address some of the flaws and limitations regarding the content
and implementation of this particular sanction.
First, by enhancing the operational period of SSOs so that their duration is
twice as long as the term of custody being suspended (plus an equivalent
additional period of time that people would otherwise have served subject to
post-custodial license in the community), our proposals would increase the
punitive weight of SSOs. This would increase sentencers’ confidence in these
sanctions. In turn, we think it is reasonable to expect that the courts would be
69. The starting point sentence under the current guideline is 26 weeks for this profile of fraud,
(FRAUD, BRIBERY AND MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES. DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE (SENTENCING
COUNCIL FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 2014) but the presence of several aggravating factors would
likely have resulted in a longer term of custody, at which point the question would be whether a
suspended sentence order would be appropriate. To resolve this issue a court would turn to the
Council’s 2016 guideline which as noted (supra note 28) states that one of the factors which would
make an SSO appropriate is that imposition of immediate custody would result in significant harm to
other parties, in this case the defendant’s children.
70. By the courts at least. Many academic commentators and advocacy groups would likely take a
different view. The public also may find some form of suspended sentence to be a more appropriate
option, particularly if constructed to have greater impact upon the defendant. For example, one survey
found most members of the public believed that being a main caretaker for children should result in a
more lenient sentence. See Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough, Custody or Community? Exploring the
Boundaries of Public Punitiveness in England and Wales, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 181 (2011).
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more willing to impose SSOs in place of sentences of immediate imprisonment,
rather than community orders as has largely been the case in recent years. By
increasing the number of SSOs at the expense of sentences of immediate
imprisonment, our proposals have the potential to significantly reduce both the
economic costs associated with imprisonment as well as some of the human
harms associated with institutionalization. Second, reinvesting some of these
savings to increase the quality and availability of rehabilitative requirements,
such as alcohol treatment, attendance centers, and mental health treatment,
would ensure that these services were adequately funded and resourced,
thereby enhancing both the quality of SSOs and the confidence of sentencers in
these sanctions.
In short, the English experience demonstrates that there is a role for a
suspended sentence of imprisonment at sentencing, even when the statutory
framework is far from perfect. That said, the current regime in England and
Wales clearly requires amendment. Parliament should undertake appropriate
reforms, particularly if research in the coming years suggests that the
Sentencing Council’s guideline on the use of disposals has failed to correct the
problem of net-widening identified in this and previous publications.

